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Introduction 
For a tense six months, it seemed possible that the Trump 
Administration would be ordered to do the impossible. A clash of injunctions 
from different federal courts seemed imminent, one commanding it to 
continue part of a program inherited from the Obama Administration—and 
another commanding it to halt the program, full stop. In early 2018, district 
courts in California and in New York issued matching preliminary 
injunctions ordering the Government to continue renewing Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) recipients, thus disallowing the Government 
from canceling DACA altogether.1 But by late that summer, it seemed fairly 
obvious that a district court in Texas was going to rule that DACA was 
unlawful to begin with and therefore must end.2 In the meantime, a district 
court in Maryland found nothing legally wrong with the Government’s 
 
* Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law and Vice Dean for Intellectual Life, Columbia Law 
School. This Article was prepared for the Texas Law Review Symposium held at The University of 
Texas School of Law, and I am grateful to the organizers and journal editors for their kind invitation. 
I also thank Robert Bone, Albert Choi, John Golden, Alexandra Lahav, Leah Litman, Kyle Logue, 
Thomas Merrill, J.J. Prescott, Judith Resnik, Charles Silver, Mila Sohoni, Abraham Wicklegren, 
and workshop participants at the University of Michigan and at this symposium for their insightful 
suggestions, as well as Jennifer Dayrit and Jake Todd for outstanding research assistance. 
1. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1048 (N.D. 
Cal. 2018), aff’d, 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019); Batalla Vidal 
v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 437 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), cert. before judgment granted, 139 S. Ct. 
2773 (2019). 
2. Vivian Yee, Can DACA Survive Its Latest Legal Attack in Texas?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/09/us/daca-texas-courts-immigration.html [https://
perma.cc/2C5Y-9L9A]. 
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rescission,3 while another across the Potomac in D.C. made the opposite 
ruling that the rescission should be vacated as unlawful.4 In this turbulence, 
everyone braced for a chaotic landing. 
And yet the danger was averted. By the time the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari on the DACA cases nearly a year later, the Government was 
operating under what turned out to be a neatly matching set of judicial orders. 
This was not because the district courts had limited their orders to specific 
parties or geographies. To the contrary, these orders were held up by all as 
prime examples of so-called nationwide or universal injunctions.5 And it was 
certainly not because the judges agreed about the legality of either DACA 
itself or its rescission. To the contrary, the judge in Texas accepted the 
Government’s arguments that DACA was unlawful; and besides, even those 
courts ruling against the Government diverged on the ideal scope of relief. 
Nonetheless, a steady state had emerged that lasted for more than a year: two 
concurrent injunctions were in effect from the judges in California and New 
York, identical in scope; these orders were matched, in effect, by a partial 
stay of vacatur by the judge in D.C.; the judge in Maryland had issued no 
order at all; and despite his views on the merits, the judge in Texas found 
reason to deny a contradictory injunction.6 No appeals court disrupted this 
arrangement.7 
How can such consonance emerge among federal judges expressing 
very different views and, in fact, making contrary rulings? The risk of 
conflicting injunctions is a familiar beast.8 It is recognized in the Federal 
 
3. CASA de Md. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 284 F. Supp. 3d 758, 779 (D. Md. 2018), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 924 F.3d 684 (4th Cir. 2019). 
4. NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457, 474 (D.D.C. 2018), cert. before judgment granted, 
139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019). 
5. See, e.g., Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1077 
(2018) (noting that district courts issued nationwide injunctions in the DACA cases); William P. 
Barr, End Nationwide Injunctions, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2019, 6:37 PM), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/end-nationwide-injunctions-11567723072 [https://perma.cc/HA92-KC9K] (using DACA 
cases as an example of nationwide injunctions); Alan Feuer, Second Federal Judge Issues Injunction 
to Keep DACA in Place, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/13
/nyregion/daca-dreamers-injunction-trump.html [https://perma.cc/CGN6-KTDZ] (characterizing 
the ruling in one of the DACA cases as a nationwide injunction). 
6. Texas v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 3d 662, 742–43 (S.D. Tex. 2018); see also Michael D. 
Shear, Federal Judge in Texas Delivers Unexpected Victory for DACA Program, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/31/us/politics/texas-judge-daca.html [https://
perma.cc/5HFQ-WVZT]. 
7. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court in California. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 486 (9th Cir. 2018). The Fourth Circuit reversed the district 
court in Maryland. CASA de Md. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 924 F.3d 684, 690–91 (4th Cir. 
2019). 
8. Although the issue has received much attention in recent debates over nationwide or universal 
injunctions against the federal government, that of course is not the only relevant context. A clash 
of injunctions could occur—and thus the need for coordination exists—any time more than one 
plaintiff is asking the courts to issue incompatible orders against the same defendant. This includes 
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Rules of Civil Procedure as a rationale for involuntary joinder or even 
mandatory class actions.9 In the discourse on nationwide injunctions, its 
shadow is invoked as a reason not to grant broad relief.10 And yet, tracking 
down actual sightings of this beast has not been easy.11 The alignment that 
appeared in the DACA cases seems not to be any sort of rare exception, even 
if it may be lauded as an exemplary occurrence of judicial comity. 
This Article suggests a way of thinking about the threat of conflicting 
injunctions, addressing both “How do judges always seem to avoid this 
problem?” and “How should judges avoid it?” As Part I will elaborate, the 
starting point is to see the situation facing such judges as a common decision 
problem known in the social sciences and in legal scholarship as a 
coordination game. Here is an example: Imagine that on a single-lane road, 
one car is heading east and another west. As they approach each other, the 
question arises, “Who keeps going and who yields?”12 Each would prefer the 
right of way. If neither yields—disaster. And yet, if both politely pull over, 
neither is satisfied and the question iterates, “Now, who goes and who 
 
cases with private defendants as well as cases in which injunctions are limited in geographic scope 
(for example, cases limited to federal circuit boundaries or even a single federal district). And 
clashes remain possible even in cases where the injunctions are “plaintiff-oriented” rather than 
“defendant-oriented.” See, e.g., Michael T. Morley, Disaggregating Nationwide Injunctions, 71 
ALA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2019) (presenting a taxonomy distinguishing plaintiff-oriented from 
defendant-oriented injunctions but recognizing that “[w]hen a case involves indivisible rights, in 
which it is impossible to enforce the rights of the plaintiff before the court without thereby also 
enforcing others’ rights as well, a valid plaintiff-oriented injunction will resemble a nationwide 
defendant-oriented injunction”); id. at 38 (citing Frost, supra note 5, at 1082–84, 1091–92) (offering 
examples). 
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(ii), 23(b)(1)(A). 
10. See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring) (condemning “the routine issuance of universal injunctions” as “patently unworkable, 
sowing chaos for litigants, the government, courts, and all those affected by these conflicting 
decisions”); Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. 
L. REV. 417, 462–64 (2017) (discussing the risk of conflicting injunctions “lurking in the 
background”); Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2143–44 (2017) 
(suggesting that the risk of conflicting injunctions could be reduced by limiting the geographic scope 
of remedies to what is “necessary to afford complete relief”). 
11. See, e.g., Spencer E. Amdur & David Hausman, Response, Nationwide Injunctions and 
Nationwide Harm, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 49, 52 (2017) (observing that “the risk of conflicting 
injunctions is vanishingly low”); Frost, supra note 5, at 1106 (maintaining that conflicts are “rare” 
and pose no “significant problems”); Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 
133 HARV. L. REV. 920, 995–96 (2020) (commenting that the risk of conflicting injunctions is “a 
risk that rounds to zero”). 
12. This illustration is sometimes presented as a problem of cars approaching an intersection 
with no traffic signals (with interesting variations represented by differences in the structure of the 
situation). See, e.g., ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION, AND 
WELFARE 34–52 (1986) (setting forth and analyzing the “crossroads game”); Richard H. McAdams, 
A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1704–13 (2000) (analyzing the 
potential role of law or other focal points in such an intersection game, crediting the original 
illustration to Professor Sugden). 
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yields?”13 What each driver does depends on what he expects the other to do, 
and so the situation is resolved when each driver’s expectation happens to 
align with the other’s decision: one goes (expecting the other to yield), and 
one yields (expecting the other to go). Altogether, we know there won’t be a 
crash; instead, one and only one car will yield. But which? And how will the 
drivers’ expectations converge about who goes and who yields? 
In the judicial coordination problem, one might imagine two judges with 
parallel cases. Each is on the verge of issuing a preliminary injunction that 
would clash with the other’s. Each has the option to stay her own order (that 
is, to yield). If both issue injunctions—disaster. Each would rather yield than 
clash. And yet, it is unsustainable for both to yield, as each feels compelled 
to grant relief to the deserving party in her own case if the other judge is 
going to yield anyway. Whether she does so depends on what she expects the 
other judge to do. And so, here we are again: We know this situation won’t 
result in a clash of injunctions. But how will the judges know who should go 
and who should yield? 
A classic solution to such collective indecision is to create a set of shared 
understandings—call it a convention—that allows one of the possible 
resolutions to become the obvious focal point around which everyone’s 
expectations can align.14 For example, everyone knows that the first car to 
flash its lights will yield. And so, if the eastbound car flashes its lights first, 
it now expects the other to go (and so it had better yield), and the westbound 
car now expects the other to yield (and so it might as well go). The 
effectiveness of such a convention is due neither to sanctions nor to binding 
authority. Rather, it works simply by creating compatible expectations about 
what others will do. That is enough to achieve coordination.15 
And thus we arrive at my second task in this Article, which is to propose 
such a shared convention for judges facing a potential clash of injunctions. I 
will do so by articulating a principle for judges to adopt when they find 
themselves in such a situation—a principle for coordinating injunctions.16 
 
13. Note that sorting this out can be tricky even when the drivers can communicate: “Please, 
you first.” “No, you, I insist.” 
14. The vast literature on such focal points begins with the classic exposition by Professor 
Schelling. THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 57 (1960) (“Most situations—
perhaps every situation for people who are practiced at this kind of game—provide some clue for 
coordinating behavior, some focal point for each person’s expectation of what the other expects him 
to expect to be expected to do.”); see also McAdams, supra note 12, at 1659–66 (recognizing 
Schelling’s contribution and applying the concept of focal points as a possible mechanism for the 
law’s expressive effect on organizing behavior). 
15. SCHELLING, supra note 14, at 54 (“What is necessary is to coordinate predictions, to read 
the same message in the common situation, to identify the one course of action that their 
expectations of each other can converge on. They must ‘mutually recognize’ some unique signal 
that coordinates their expectations of each other.”). 
16. Throughout this Article, I will use the term injunction as a shorthand to capture not only 
preliminary injunctions and permanent injunctions, but also other forms of relief that compel 
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Any such principle should be intuitive and easy to imagine,17 and it should 
sound in judicial integrity and comity. What is needed for it to work, after 
all, is not only for a judge to be willing to adopt the principle herself but also 
for her to expect that other judges will adopt it too. 
Here is the proposed principle: Each district judge should issue or stay 
her injunction in accordance with the outcome she thinks most district judges 
would choose.18 She should still express her views on the merits, of course, 
and specify the exact injunction she would issue (if any), were there no risk 
of conflicting injunctions. Yet, because she recognizes that the risk is real, 
she must also make a further issue-or-stay decision.19 If her intended 
injunction would achieve the outcome that she thinks most district judges 
would try to achieve if they were ruling on their own, taking any appellate 
guidance into account, then she should issue it.20 But if her own injunction is 




changes in real-world behavior—for example, the partially stayed vacatur by the district court in 
D.C. in the DACA cases. And for present purposes, I leave alone rulings that do not compel changes 
to behavior; however, a similar logic to what is articulated here could in theory be applied to 
inconsistent rulings (in contexts where that may be seen as a problem) as well as to inconsistent 
obligations (the main concern in this Article). 
17. As Professor Schelling notes, “A prime characteristic of most of these ‘solutions’ to the 
problems, that is, of the clues or coordinators or focal points, is some kind of prominence or 
conspicuousness.” SCHELLING, supra note 14. 
18. Naturally, she should have in mind only the population of district judges who could in theory 
have an overlapping case (and hence could in theory issue clashing injunctions), given the nature of 
the litigation. For example, in a case involving a nationwide or universal injunction, she would 
likely be making a (heuristic) guess about where she stands relative to the views of the population 
of all federal district judges. But for a case involving, say, a statewide injunction, she would be 
making such a guess about her colleagues within the state. And in some cases the universe of 
relevant judges for her to consider may depend on limitations of jurisdiction or venue. 
19. Stays pending appeal may be the most familiar such practice, in which a federal judge 
articulates what she believes to be appropriate relief while also staying that relief. Another example 
is an emergent practice in which a federal court articulates the nationwide or universal injunction 
that it deems appropriate, while staying it except as to the immediate plaintiff or to a limited 
geographic area—as seen in the recent “sanctuary cities” cases. See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 
321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 882 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (granting a nationwide permanent injunction, but staying 
its effect outside of Chicago); City and County of San Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924, 
934 (N.D. Cal. 2018), judgment entered sub nom. California ex rel. Becerra v. Sessions, No. 3:17-
CV-04701-WHO, 2018 WL 6069940 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2018) (granting a nationwide permanent 
injunction, but staying its effect outside of California). 
20. Her estimation of the majority view must, of course, consider any appellate or Supreme 
Court guidance that she thinks might sway most of her relevant district-level colleagues toward a 
given view. That the principle is formally stated in terms of what most district judges would do is 
not to suggest ignoring such guidance; rather, it is to recognize that remedial design is a task distinct 
from deciding merits issues (which are more likely to have appellate guidance) and that district 
courts may have greater institutional competence than appeals courts in fashioning injunctive relief 
(as indicated by typically deferential standards of review). See infra subpart II(D). 
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stay it.21 Her role is to implement that outcome, or else not get in the way. 
And she should also explain in her opinion why her own position aligns with 
or departs from her estimate of the majority view—much as she would 
explain (under existing practice) why her position might not be affirmed by 
the circuit court when she is ordering a stay pending appeal. 
This majority principle has several advantages, as Part II will detail. 
First of all, it is a most natural answer to the question, “What would we end 
up doing if we all decided this together as a group?” Going with the majority 
view, needless to say, is a thoroughly familiar approach throughout the 
federal courts.22 More generally, following the principle entails taking the 
views of other judges into account in a way that promotes ideals of comity, 
parity, and collegiality among judges. Together, these intuitive qualities 
make it a salient and attractive focal point for the judicial coordination 
problem,23 one that can smooth the judges’ paths toward a stable set of 
consonant injunctions and stays. 
But wait—if federal judges are already doing rather well in avoiding 
conflicting injunctions, what’s the problem? There remains the issue of how 
to converge on the better outcome. Even if we are sure that judges will avoid 
conflicting injunctions by somehow finding a stable outcome in which some 
of them yield, one such equilibrium might be superior to another.24 Here, the 
proposed principle offers both the substantive and procedural benefits of 
converging on an outcome that likely reflects the true majority view, 
including possibly greater legitimacy. Part II will elaborate on the 
advantages, as well as potential difficulties, of this approach by comparing it 




21. To be clear, the term outcome refers to real consequences—a state of the world—rather than 
a specific ruling or remedial form. It could be a holding pattern achieved by a preliminary injunction 
(or allowed by a stay); it could be a longer term steady state achieved by a permanent injunction or 
by vacatur as final relief; or it could just be the initial state of affairs. There can be multiple ways 
for a court ruling to achieve or allow the same state of the world. For example, in the DACA cases 
discussed above, the same holding pattern (in which the Government would continue to process 
renewals but not new applications) was achieved or allowed by various district courts through 
formally different rulings or remedies (notably, the two preliminary injunctions, a partial stay of 
vacatur as final relief, and a denial of a contrary preliminary injunction). 
22. These advantages are just as obvious in a scenario where judges can expressly communicate 
with each other. Recall that even when communication is possible, it is still useful to have a focal 
point determined by a principle upon which everyone can readily agree. 
23. As Professor Schelling observes, “[f]inding the [focal point] . . . may depend on imagination 
more than on logic; it may depend on analogy, precedent, accidental arrangement, symmetry, 
aesthetic or geometric configuration, casuistic reasoning, and who the parties are and what they 
know about each other.” SCHELLING, supra note 14. That is, “[p]oets may do better than logicians 
at this game . . . .” Id. at 58. 
24. Cf. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 40 (1994) (“Experimental 
work on coordination games . . . suggests that players do not necessarily choose the Nash 
equilibrium that is in the individual interests of the parties and in their joint interest as well.”). 
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Most notably, the majority principle compares favorably against an 
individualistic default in which each judge acts as if there were no other 
parallel cases. Under the proposed principle, judges with diverse views will 
have a better chance of acting in alignment from the very beginning, for the 
simple reason that their best guesses about the majority view are probably 
more similar than their individual views.25 (This may also translate into 
less reason for forum-shopping.) Moreover, if any difference appears, 
convergence should occur more smoothly for two reasons:26 First, a course 
correction would not signify abandoning one’s own view of what is right, but 
rather updating one’s best guess at the majority view. Second, if it becomes 
apparent which judges’ initial guesses are the outliers, all judges will then 
know who should course-correct and who should hold the course.27 
Part III highlights one important reason why the coordinated outcomes 
we already observe might not be the result of such a collectively informed 
process of equilibrium selection. Consider this scenario: One judge decides 
first. Then another, and another. Even with cases brought around the same 
time and running in parallel, judges are not generally issuing orders 
simultaneously. And once one judge has issued an injunction, there is 
pressure on later judges to act consistently with it (issuing a matching 
injunction or staying one that is incompatible) given the need to avoid a clash. 
One might notice that in the DACA cases, the resulting set of coordinated 
orders exactly matches the injunction issued by the first judge.28 
 
25. This seems all the more true if the reason for the district judges’ divergent views is a circuit 
split on relevant issues. Why the proposed convention is workable even when circuit splits exist 
(and indeed, why it allows “percolation” to continue) is addressed in the discussion of the role of 
the appeals courts in subpart III(A). 
26. When a judge’s guess about the majority view is highly correlated with his own view, or 
when judges in the overlapping cases are likely to guess differently at first for any other reason, then 
a mechanism for smooth course correction becomes all the more important. Moreover, in such 
circumstances, aggregating different judges’ guesses at the majority view may be more likely (than 
aggregating their individual views) to result in an outcome that reflects the true majority view. See 
infra subpart II(C). 
27. In subpart II(C), I will say more about why noticing the outliers is a more effective prompt 
for course correction when judges are guessing at the majority view under the proposed principle, 
than when judges are expressing their own views under the individualistic default. 
28. Even the judge in D.C., whose vacatur seemed initially to go beyond the earlier injunctions, 
quickly scaled back its effect (using a partial stay) to match the others. NAACP v. Trump, 321 F. 
Supp. 3d 143, 146 (D.D.C. 2018) (“The Court will stay its order as to new DACA applications and 
applications for advance parole, but not as to renewal applications.”). The judge explained: 
The Court is mindful that continuing the stay in this case will temporarily deprive 
certain DACA-eligible individuals, and plaintiffs in these cases, of relief to which the 
Court has concluded they are legally entitled. But the Court is also aware of the 
significant confusion and uncertainty that currently surrounds the status of the DACA 
program, which is now the subject of litigation in multiple federal district courts and 
courts of appeals. Because that confusion would only be magnified if the Court’s order 
regarding initial DACA applications were to take effect now and later be reversed on 
appeal, the Court will grant a limited stay of its order and preserve the status quo 
pending appeal, as plaintiffs themselves suggest. 
Id. 
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The result will still be coordinated and disaster still averted, but now it 
is due to a path dependence in which all other judges match or avoid clashing 
with the first injunction issued. I will propose that, in taking on such a 
responsibility, any judge who thinks she might be the first to issue an order 
should adopt the same principle already described—acting consistently with 
her best guess of what a majority of the relevant pool of district judges would 
view as the better outcome. Doing so becomes an even stronger expression 
of comity in this sequential story, for she would in effect be disavowing her 
own first-mover advantage relative to her colleagues. (This approach should 
also reduce incentives for forum-shopping litigants to race to the courthouse.)  
In an appropriate case, this first judge might even stay her own 
injunction while clearly expressing what she would do, as she awaits similar 
expressions from her colleagues in the parallel cases. In essence, she would 
be acting as if every court were deciding at the same time, a posture of 
symmetry that resonates with ideals of collegiality and parity.29 Her 
first-mover advantage then becomes a form of leadership in announcing a 
comity-based convention for others to adopt.30 
Part III will also address the role of appeals courts in reviewing the 
decisions of district judges who are applying the majority principle—
including what happens when there is a circuit split on the underlying merits. 
It will then acknowledge the limitations of this Article’s analysis, including 
the crucial assumption that the judges involved are averse to conflicting 
injunctions. Conventions have their breaking points, and this one is no 
exception: under certain conditions it won’t be much use. The Conclusion 
then entertains the thought that some approximation of the convention 
proposed here may be what some courts are already doing. 
I. The Judicial Coordination Problem 
Consider this scenario: Two judges with parallel cases are each on the 
verge of issuing a preliminary injunction, and these injunctions will conflict 
if issued. Each judge will write an opinion ruling on all the prerequisite merits 
questions and articulating the injunctive relief she believes is warranted. In 
light of the potential conflict, however, each judge faces the additional 
question, “Should I issue this injunction, or should I stay it?” In each judge’s 
view, the ideal outcome is for her injunction to be issued while the other’s is  
 
29. The careful reader may notice that this is why the exposition has started with the scenario 
in which judges seem to be deciding at the same time, rather than starting with the first-come-first-
served scenario (even though it may seem more likely). 
30. The possibility that this first judge may recognize in retrospect that she has guessed wrong 
about the majority view (as other judges’ guesses become known) will be discussed in more detail 
in subpart III(A). Suffice it to say for now that this possibility is a good reason for her to stay, 
initially. She may not be able to stay, however, if she deems the hardships of even momentarily 
waiting for other district judges to weigh in to be too great (such as in cases of extreme time 
sensitivity). Subpart II(B) will spell out how this resembles the balancing analysis required under 
current practice for a stay pending appeal. 
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stayed. A tolerable outcome is for her to stay her own while the other’s is 
issued. It is also tolerable if both judges stayed, leaving in place the current 
state of affairs. And the worst result is a clash of conflicting injunctions.31 
This Part elaborates on how the structure of such a problem fits what is 
commonly known in the social sciences and in legal scholarship as a 
coordination game.32 The following analysis will cover the scenario above 
as well as several variations. It then reviews the standard logic of such a 
coordination game, showing that one of two stable outcomes is likely to 
emerge; in each, one judge issues an injunction, and the other stays. What is 
unlikely to be observed due to its inherent instability, however, is a set of 
conflicting injunctions. 
A. The Structure of the Problem 
The outcomes of the four possible combinations of choices by the two 
judges, in the scenario described above, are shown in Figure 1. Judge A’s 
options are shown on the vertical axis, and Judge B’s options are shown on 
the horizontal axis. Judge A’s view of each outcome is listed on the lower 








31. A classic statement of this aversion to creating a clash of injunctions is Judge Posner’s: 
Where different outcomes would place the defendant under inconsistent legal duties, 
the case for the second court’s not going into conflict with the first is particularly 
strong. A conflict would place the defendant in an impossible position unless the 
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, which it might be reluctant to do if the 
conflicting decisions, however excruciating for the defendant, raised no issue of 
general significance—yet might feel obliged to do anyway. 
Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1124 (7th Cir. 1987). And the defendant is sure to bring 
this difficulty to the court’s attention—even when the defendant might believe that the preexisting 
injunction is wrong. See, e.g., Federal Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction at 17–18, Texas v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 3d 662 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-
00068) (arguing in the Texas DACA case that because other district courts have already issued 
“legally incorrect and overbroad nationwide preliminary injunctions,” this court should refrain from 
issuing a contradictory injunction or at least stay it, while the defendants try to challenge the earlier 
injunctions before the Supreme Court). 
32. Throughout this Article, the term coordination refers to this framework as applied to the 
potential clash of injunctions, as distinct from other important questions about overlapping remedies 
and their interactions. See generally Bert I. Huang, Surprisingly Punitive Damages, 100 VA. L. REV. 
1027 (2014) (proposing ways to reduce redundancy in punitive damages and in statutory damages 
by running damages “concurrently”); Leah Litman, Remedial Convergence and Collapse, 106 CAL. 
L. REV. 1477 (2018) (identifying convergence and spillovers in doctrinal constraints across forms 
of remedies, undermining the possibility that one form might serve as backup for another); Kyle 
Logue, Coordinating Sanctions in Torts, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2313 (2010) (analyzing possible 
distortions to deterrence due to redundancy between tort damages and regulatory sanctions). 
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Readers may recognize this as a particular coordination game 
(commonly called the hawk–dove game) often used to represent situations in 
which the key question is, “Who yields?”33 The literature on this game is 
well-developed, thanks to its applicability to many issues in economics, 
political science, sociology, and evolutionary biology.34 An early, rich, and 
influential analysis of such situations is that of Professor Thomas Schelling, 
who emphasized the crucial role that shared expectations of behavior—
whether one calls it a convention, norms, precedent, etiquette, culture, or as 
he did, a focal point—can play in enabling coordination.35 In legal 
scholarship, Professor Richard McAdams has thoroughly studied this game 
as one means by which the law might promote coordination among parties 
 
33. See, e.g., RICHARD MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWER OF LAW 37 (2015) (explaining 
that “[t]he game involves conflict with a need for coordination” in that “there is . . . a common 
interest in avoiding what each regards as the worst possible outcome,” and yet “[t]here is conflict 
because each equilibrium has unequal payoffs, one favoring Player 1 and the other favoring 
Player 2”). 
34. See, e.g., Paul R. Krugman, Is Free Trade Passé?, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1987, at 131, 135–
36 (using the hawk–dove game to model competition between two firms in the absence of a 
subsidy); J. Maynard Smith & G.R. Price, The Logic of Animal Conflict, 246 NATURE 15, 15–16 
(1973) (using the hawk–dove game to understand why conflicts between animals of the same 
species rarely result in serious injury); Glenn H. Snyder, “Prisoner’s Dilemma” and “Chicken” 
Models in International Politics, 15 INT’L STUD. Q. 66, 82–93 (1971) (using the hawk–dove game 
to understand international crises). 
35. As Professor Schelling put it: 
The odd characteristic of all these games is that neither rival can gain by outsmarting 
the other. Each loses unless he does exactly what the other expects him to do. Each 
party is the prisoner or the beneficiary of their mutual expectations; no one can disavow 
his own expectation of what the other will expect him to expect to be expected to do. 
SCHELLING, supra note 14, at 60. 
Figure 1 
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with conflicting interests in a variety of contexts,36 and his joint work with 
Professor Janice Nadler has offered experimental evidence of the 
effectiveness of supplying a focal point.37 
For present purposes, there is no need to put numerical values on these 
outcomes. What matters to the analysis is the relative ordering of the 
outcomes in each judge’s view—“ideal” is better than “tolerable,” which is 
still better than “worst.”38 But for a stylized illustration of what such an 
ordering might mean, one might imagine assigning point values to those 
labels, as seen in Figure 2. Setting zero to represent the initial situation, the 
judge gains two units of value if the right outcome occurs because her own 
injunction goes into effect, she loses one unit of value if the wrong outcome 
occurs because the other judge’s injunction is in effect, and she loses three 
units of value if there is a clash of injunctions. For Judge A, the resulting 
value is thus 2 when she issues her injunction while Judge B stays, an 
outcome we can call {injunction A, stay B}. It is −1 if she stays while Judge B 
issues his injunction, in {stay A, injunction B}. It is 0 in {stay A, stay B}, 
where both stay. And it is −3 in {injunction A, injunction B}, where the 
judges issue conflicting injunctions. These are listed in Figure 2, as are the 
















36. MCADAMS, supra note 33, at 36–48. 
37. Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Coordinating in the Shadow of the Law: Two 
Contextualized Tests of the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance, 42 L. & SOC’Y REV. 865, 868 
(2008); Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Testing the Focal Point Theory of Legal 
Compliance: The Effect of Third-Party Expression in an Experimental Hawk/Dove Game, 2 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 87, 108–09 (2005).  
38. A technical note: The numerical values are not necessary for analyzing this game in pure 
strategies (assuming that each judge’s expectation about the other’s strategy is binary rather than 
probabilistic). Mixed strategies are not considered because they are unrealistic, both as a matter of 
judicial practice and as a matter of judges’ expectations about what other judges will do. 
   Judge B 
















            –3      
 
  –3 
 
 
             –1 
 






             2 
 
   –1 
 
 
             0 
 
   0 
Figure 2 
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Two variations with different illustrative point values may be worth 
mentioning—showing how the same setup can represent a range of situations 
with the same underlying logic. In some cases, a judge might believe that the 
other judge’s injunction actually makes things somewhat better than the 
initial situation (in Figure 2, the −1 could be replaced by a positive value of 
1), though not as much as her own injunction would do. Or in some cases, a 
judge might believe that the other judge’s injunction is no better or worse 
than the initial situation (in Figure 2, the −1 can be replaced by 0 for that 
judge); for example, the injunction requested from one of the judges may be 
one that preserves the current state of affairs. In terms of Figure 1, these 
variations can be seen as allowing for gradations of the meaning of 
“tolerable.” 
What these illustrations have in common is that, for each judge, the ideal 
is still to issue her own injunction while the other judge stays, and the worst 
is still the clash of injunctions. This relative ordering is what is crucial for the 
present analysis (not the illustrative point values), and no doubt the reader 
can imagine further variations that meet these simple conditions. 
Given the assumption of this relative ordering, both judges would prefer 
any other outcome over the one with conflicting injunctions. Thus, if Judge B 
expects Judge A to issue her injunction, then he would prefer to stay because 
he prefers {injunction A, stay B} to {injunction A, injunction B}. And the 
same logic applies for Judge A. But both judges would also prefer to issue an 
injunction if the other is expected to stay. If Judge B expects Judge A to stay, 
he will issue his injunction because he prefers {stay A, injunction B} over 
{stay A, stay B}. And the same logic applies for Judge A. In this sense, both 
{injunction A, injunction B} and {stay A, stay B} are inherently unstable. 
Should either of these unstable outcomes happen to materialize or seem 
imminent, at least one of the judges would prefer to switch to a different 
choice.39 
By contrast, the {stay A, injunction B} and {injunction A, stay B} 
combinations are stable and self-reinforcing. Once the judges have arrived at 
either combination, by chance or by design, neither will have any reason to 
switch on her own. In fact, each has good reason to hold the course. (Such a 
 
39. For readers who are fluent in game theory, I should note that although the problem has been 
characterized so far as a simultaneous-move, one-period coordination game, in my storytelling I am 
implying that the single period includes enough time for some adjustments before arriving at a Nash 
equilibrium. I find this to be a convenient shorthand suitable to the context: 
When the goal is prediction[,] . . . a Nash equilibrium can also be interpreted as a 
potential stable point of a dynamic adjustment process in which individuals adjust their 
behavior to that of the other players in the game, searching for strategy choices that 
will give them better results. 
Charles A. Holt & Alvin E. Roth, The Nash Equilibrium: A Perspective, 101 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. U.S. 3999, 3999 (2004). An alternative formulation might be to consider such adjustments as 
occurring during additional periods in an iterated hawk–dove game, but for present purposes, that 
would complicate the analysis in an unnecessary way. 
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combination is known in the literature as a Nash equilibrium.)40 Each judge 
would switch only if she expected the other judge to switch too. In effect, to 
depart from such a stable outcome, the judges would have to do so in concert. 
B. The Rarity of Conflicting Injunctions 
There is good reason to focus our attention on combinations that are 
stable and self-reinforcing the way that {stay A, injunction B} and 
{injunction A, stay B} are. As a matter of predicting outcomes, these stable 
equilibria tell us where things are likely to end up (after some initial 
adjustment if needed).41 This is because judges maintain control over their 
injunctions and stays, and they can modify them at any time. 
Imagine, for example, that the two judges each choose initially to stay 
their own injunctions. They write opinions expressing their views of the 
merits and articulating the relief they believe to be warranted; but their 
injunctions are stayed, maybe out of an abundance of caution, maybe out of 
respect for their colleague’s parallel proceedings, or maybe out of an interest 
in hearing what the other judge has to say. This initial position is {stay A, 
stay B}. This is tolerable for both, but Judge A would prefer to switch to 
issuing her injunction if Judge B is going to stay anyway. Judge B is thinking 
the same thing about his own injunction. Accordingly, one or both of them 
will soon lift the stay. If only one judge does so, they have arrived at a stable 
outcome. If both happen to do so at the same time, the worst outcome might 
appear but only for a moment before one yields—and then they arrive at a 
stable outcome. 
By the same logic, we also know where things are not likely to end up: 
with conflicting injunctions. The coordination game described in this Part is 
a structured story in which, because judges will yield if necessary, conflicting 
injunctions do not persist. Even if they might occur for a moment (or seem 
imminent), we know that one of the judges will soon yield. What we don’t 
know is: which one? 
II. The Majority Principle 
So far, this Article has set out an intuitive, even self-evident, account of 
why conflicting injunctions are rarely seen: they are inherently unstable 
outcomes if judges would rather stay their own injunctions than allow such a 
clash.42 Yet, averting a clash is only half of the problem posed by the risk of 
conflicting injunctions. Because there are two stable and self-reinforcing 
 
40. Another technical note: The analysis throughout this Article will be restricted to pure 
strategies. As mentioned, this is because mixed strategies are unrealistic in this context. 
Accordingly, attention on equilibria will also be limited to Nash equilibria in pure strategies. 
41. See Holt & Roth, supra note 39 (explaining that a Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as a 
stable point potentially resulting from such adjustments). 
42. What might happen if one or more of the judges with parallel cases are not averse to a clash 
is addressed in subpart III(B). 
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outcomes (each with one judge issuing an injunction and the other judge 
staying), the question arises: Which of the two will occur? Which injunction 
will be issued and which stayed? This descriptive ambiguity also implies 
normative possibility: Is there a way to tip the odds towards the better of the 
two outcomes? And is there a way to smooth the path toward that 
equilibrium? 
By way of addressing these questions, this Article now proposes a 
principle for judges to apply when facing such a coordination problem.43 It is 
a principle that enjoys independent appeal as a matter of comity, seems 
intuitive enough to serve plausibly as a shared expectation of what other 
judges will do, steers the group of judges toward the stable outcome that 
brings the likely advantages of accuracy and legitimacy, and encourages 
convergence on this outcome by lowering the hurdle of justification for those 
judges who will need to stay their own orders to avoid the clash of 
injunctions. 
A. Applying the Principle 
This is the principle: Each district judge should issue or stay her 
injunction in accordance with the outcome she thinks most district judges 
would choose. Specifically, she should make a best guess at the majority view 
within the population of district judges who could in theory hear overlapping 
cases and issue conflicting injunctions.44 Depending on the nature of the 
litigation, this may be a nationwide pool or some subset limited by geography 
or jurisdiction. 
Going with the majority view among the relevant judges may sound like 
a rather obvious thing to suggest—and I would hope so. Because majority 
rule is already so familiar within the federal judiciary, this principle is an 
instantly salient answer to the question, “What would we end up doing if we 
all decided this together as a group?”45 Moreover, in some instances, thinking 
about what other judges would do might already be a part of a judge’s process 
in deciding what she herself will do. For present purposes, the more obvious 
 
43. It serves the purpose so crisply described by Professor Schelling: “What is necessary is to 
coordinate predictions, to read the same message in the common situation, to identify the one course 
of action that their expectations of each other can converge on. They must ‘mutually recognize’ 
some unique signal that coordinates their expectations of each other.” SCHELLING, supra note 14, 
at 54. 
44. The important distinction between this imagined population of potential judges and the 
small subset of judges who actually have such an overlapping case before them—along with the 
reasons to focus on the former group rather than the latter—is detailed in subpart II(D). 
45. As Professor Schelling observes: “Most situations—perhaps every situation for people who 
are practiced at this kind of game—provide some clue for coordinating behavior, some focal point 
for each person’s expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be expected to do.” 
SCHELLING, supra note 14. It is worth emphasizing that the preexistence of such a focal point can 
matter even when open communication is possible because the logic that makes a focal point so 
powerful in a tacit coordination game can also exert a pull on the parties’ bargaining in a 
coordination game with communication. Id. at 67–70, 73–74. 
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this principle seems to be, the better it will do in creating a focal point for the 
coordination problem—that is, in creating shared expectations identifying 
who should go ahead and who should yield. 
It should be emphasized that the principle concerns only the decision 
about issuing or staying an intended injunction. Even while applying this 
principle, each judge should still express her own views on the merits of the 
case and articulate the relief that she herself would order (if any) were she 
the sole judge with such a case. But for her decision whether to issue or to 
stay her intended relief, the principle counsels her to imagine what most 
district judges in the relevant pool would view as the better outcome (if they 
were ruling on their own). If she believes that her own view of the better 
outcome accords with her best guess of this majority view, then she should 
issue her injunction to achieve that outcome. If instead her own view of the 
better outcome departs from her best guess of the majority view, then she 
should stay her incompatible order—explaining that despite her own 
reasoned views, she is nonetheless staying it in light of the presence of 
parallel cases and the risk of conflicting injunctions. 
The advantages of this majority principle, as well as potential 
difficulties in applying it, might be best illustrated by comparing it with 
possible alternative principles. The most immediate and most useful 
comparison is between this principle and the default approach in which each 
judge acts solely based on what she believes to be the better outcome (as if 
there were no other cases and hence no possibility of conflicting injunctions). 
The following analysis will begin with this comparison before addressing 
others. 
B. Implementing Comity 
The first relative advantage of the majority principle is that it serves 
comity and collegiality in a situation where such concerns are at the fore. By 
definition, the majority principle takes account of the views of other judges, 
whereas the individualistic default approach does not. This is true even if a 
judge trying to follow the majority principle is really thinking in a heuristic 
way about where she stands relative to other judges, rather than counting 
votes on an imagined en banc court of all her relevant colleagues. However 
she approaches the task, she would be equalizing her role with other judges 
in a way that resonates with notions of parity among judges of the same rank. 
On the flip side, one possible difficulty is that the principle would seem 
to entail research into what other judges have done in similar cases. Looking 
into what other judges have done is typical legal research, a familiar task;46 
and yet, the amount of research necessary might multiply (in a case with 
broad geographic reach) if the relevant circuits differ on applicable norms or 
 
46. Besides, it is possible that some such research would also be suitable under the 
individualistic default approach. 
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doctrines for injunctive relief, or if there is a circuit split on the underlying 
merits. As a practical matter, however, the parties would bear the initial 
burdens of briefing this issue—an effort that likely overlaps with the research 
and argumentation they would already have prepared in briefing the court 
about the suitable remedy in the first place.  
Moreover, many federal judges are regularly in touch with their 
colleagues around the country—and even more so within a circuit or 
district—through their work on Judicial Conference committees,47 sittings by 
designation,48 and other collaborations and collegial communications. In 
these and other ways, a judge may have gained a sense of the various judicial 
philosophies among a wide range of colleagues, allowing easier and more 
accurate estimation of where she herself stands in relation. The more relevant 
difficulty for district judges might be the process of getting used to taking 
other judges’ views into account—a daily practice for circuit judges who 
must write opinions that satisfy a majority on a panel, but maybe not as 
habitual for most district judges except in guessing what the circuit court will 
say on appeal. 
A greater obstacle may be that the majority principle will require some 
judges to announce that they are staying relief based on what other judges 
would do. No doubt this is an unpleasant thing to have to tell the deserving 
parties in one’s own case. But it is possible to explain forthrightly that, while 
such a stay is a hardship, it is justified as an exceptional measure by the 
presence of parallel cases, which create a risk of conflicting injunctions. After 
all, explaining such a necessity is not far removed from the familiar judicial 
task of ordering a stay of relief pending appeal.  
Notably, both a stay pending appeal (under existing practice) and the 
majority-respecting stay (proposed here) require superimposing a further 
calculus upon the original weighing of equities that justified injunctive relief 
in the first place.49 Doing so in either context recognizes that another court 




47. See, e.g., U.S. Courts, About the Judicial Conference, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-
federal-courts/governance-judicial-conference/about-judicial-conference [https://perma.cc/8JR9-
SB8U] (describing the organization of Judicial Conference committees to which judges 
are appointed). 
48. See generally Marin K. Levy, Visiting Judges, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 67 (2019) (discussing 
the historical development and contemporary practice of visiting judges in the federal court system). 
49. The standard approach for deciding whether to stay an order pending appeal is articulated 
in Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). The standard is “(1) whether the stay applicant 
has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will 
be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the 
other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Id.; see also Nken 
v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434–35 (2009) (elaborating on the Hilton standard and its relation to the 
standard for preliminary injunctions). 
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undue hardship may end up befalling the “wrong” party if this court’s 
injunction is issued—thereby forcing the question of who should bear the 
interim hardships until the uncertainty is resolved. 
C. Smoothing the Path 
The main practical advantage of the majority principle is that it may 
promote smoother convergence to a well-coordinated, stable, and self-
reinforcing outcome. This is for three reasons. First, judges’ best guesses 
about the majority view are probably more similar than their individual 
views. (Think of the difference between asking everyone, “Do you think 
more people are left-handed or right-handed?” versus “Are you yourself left-
handed or right-handed?”) Thus, judges with diverse views will have a better 
chance of acting in alignment from the get-go if they are following the 
majority principle than if they are acting based on their individual views. This 
is not to suggest that there will be instant unanimity, as it seems plausible that 
a judge’s best guess about the majority view may tend to resemble her own 
view. But the formal shift in perspective allows some judges to openly 
address the gap between their own views and those of most other judges 
(“look, it’s not me—it’s them”). One might speculate that such a gap would 
be most readily admitted by those judges who already see themselves as more 
independent-minded or even iconoclastic; if so, then the principle might 
make the most difference where it is most needed. 
The second reason relates to the dynamics of convergence. As the judges 
make their initial guesses, it may become apparent which guesses are the 
outliers, if any. Seeing this, all judges will know who should course-correct 
and who should hold the course.50 For example, if four out of five judges 
initially guessed that a certain outcome would be the majority view, then it 
becomes fairly obvious that the one judge who guessed otherwise should alter 
her order.51 And if there is a seeming tie among the guesses, a tiebreaker may 
be based on the relative strengths of the guesses, as seen in the articulated 
reasoning accompanying the judges’ decisions. Each judge is not only 
announcing a guess but also explaining it, and the explanation may evince 
the judge’s degree of certainty.52 
 
50. And they will know that other judges also know, and so forth. Convergence may happen 
still more smoothly if judges can expressly communicate about selecting one of the stable outcomes. 
But note that communication is not by itself a substitute for a focal point. (Again, think of the drivers 
saying “please, you first” and “no, you, I insist.”) Rather, it is more useful to think of identifying a 
focal point as the aim of the communication—and that having an appealing principle to invoke 
during the talks may more rapidly bring everyone into alignment. 
51. In terms of the coordination game described in Part I, this learning effect solves the iterated 
question—“Now, who goes and who yields?”—that arises when the judges arrive at an unstable 
outcome such as {stay A, stay B} or {injunction A, injunction B}.  
52. The district judge may of course also express her degree of certainty about her own view of 
the right outcome (in addition to her degree of certainty about her guess at the majority view). This 
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By contrast, under the individualistic approach, there is much less useful 
information to be gained from seeing what other judges have decided to do—
precisely because the question there is “What do I believe is the better 
outcome?” Perhaps in a very close case, observing other judges’ choices 
could lead a judge to reconsider her own view. And yet, a judge may well 
surmise that the particular judges who actually have these parallel cases are 
a subset forum-shopped by interested parties. Accordingly, the judge might 
discount the signals from these selected colleagues’ individual positions 
(imagine if they were all left-handed) while having less reason to discount 
their best guesses about the majority view (as the left-handed judges would 
still say that most people are right-handed). 
Finally, there is a more subtle way in which the majority principle 
promotes smoother convergence. Imagine that the judges in the parallel cases 
turn out to have different best guesses about the majority view and thus are 
initially aiming at different outcomes. At this point, a course correction is 
necessary from one or more judges. Crucially, the initial decision of each 
judge reflects her best guess about the majority view, not her own view. And 
thus, altering that decision would not signify abandoning one’s own view of 
what is correct—but instead, updating one’s estimate of the majority view. 
This shift in framing makes it easier for the judge to justify the change to the 
parties and the public, and maybe to herself too. 
Further substantive and procedural benefits follow from this process of 
convergence among judges applying the majority principle. First, compiling 
the judges’ best guesses of the majority view may lead to greater accuracy in 
predicting the true majority view, relative to compiling their individual 
views.53 It may thus reduce the chances of disruptive alterations later, either 
 
possibility should ease the potential worry that a judge who stays her own injunction may be misread 
as signaling a lack of confidence in that remedy. Besides, it is probably a lot less awkward for a 
judge who believes strongly in her intended injunction (and yet does not wish to create a clash with 
another injunction) to stay it on grounds of the majority principle, than to try to come up with some 
other reason (which might well be misread as signaling a lack of confidence). 
53. That is, not only are the judges more likely to agree in their guesses of the majority view 
than in their individual views, as mentioned above, but the stable outcome that results from 
aggregating such guesses is also more likely to reflect the true majority view. The possible accuracy 
advantage of observing majority-view guesses rather than individual positions has found some 
empirical support in a different context: predicting election outcomes by polling voters about their 
expectations about who will win (analogous to majority-view guesses) as opposed to asking them 
whom they favor to win (analogous to individual views). See, e.g., David Rothschild & Justin 
Wolfers, Forecasting Elections: Voter Intentions Versus Expectations, BROOKINGS INST. 1  
(Nov. 1, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/research/forecasting-elections-voter-intentions-versus-
expectations/ [https://perma.cc/KCP9-KRKG] (finding evidence that “polls probing voters’ 
expectations yield more accurate predictions of election outcomes than the usual questions asking 
about who they intend to vote for”); Andreas Graefe, Accuracy of Vote Expectation Surveys in 
Forecasting Elections, 78 PUB. OPINION Q. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 204, 215, 219–20 (2014) (finding that 
voter-expectation surveys were more accurate than single polls and even combinations of polls). 
This accuracy advantage may hold even when each individual’s expectations about who will win 
are correlated, as one might expect, with their own preferences. Id. at 208, 219–21 (noting this 
 
HUANG.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/15/20 8:19 AM 
2020] Coordinating Injunctions 1349 
as new district judges weigh in or as the appeals courts take up the cases.54 
Moreover, it may be easier for a sense of legitimacy to attach to such an 
outcome than one that reflects a judge’s individual view.55 Such relative 
legitimacy may be useful for fostering public acceptance or understanding. It 
may also ease acceptance by fellow judges.56 After all, by definition, this 
approach aims to minimize the number of judges who would disagree. 
D. Alternative Principles? 
Thus far, the comparison has been between the majority principle and 
the default approach. But other conventions are also possible, and it is worth 
examining three variations that may also be salient enough to serve as 
plausible focal points in the coordination game. Despite some salutary 
qualities to each, however, none seems as promising overall as the majority 
principle already proposed. 
The first alternative is a sort of variation on the majority principle in 
which each judge is making a best guess only about the views of the specific 
judges who are actually deciding existing parallel cases (rather than an 
imagined majority view among all district judges who could in theory hear 
an overlapping case). At first blush, it may seem much easier for a judge to 
guess what a handful of known colleagues would believe to be the better 
outcome than to imagine the larger universe of relevant district judges. But 
 
problem of “wishful thinking” but still finding that voters’ expectations predicted election outcomes 
better than their intentions). And “surveys of voter expectations can still be quite accurate, even 
when drawn from non-representative samples.” Rothschild & Wolfers, supra, at 2. Moreover, the 
relative accuracy advantage is heightened when the sampled population is small—which one might 
analogize to the small number of judges with parallel cases. See id. (explaining that “[t]he 
expectations question performs particularly well . . . when small samples are involved”). 
54. Although I have somewhat simplistically labeled such accuracy a “substantive” advantage 
in part on the assumption that reflecting the true majority view is desirable, it is of course possible 
to recognize the benefits as mainly “procedural” in the ways noted here—say, if one is agnostic or 
doubtful about whether majority rule in judicial decisionmaking tends to lead to substantively good 
results. 
55. Perhaps the current criticism of nationwide injunctions imposing “the views of a single 
judge” on everyone might not have the same ring if it were a complaint about “a single judge’s best 
effort at reflecting what most judges would do.” See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Samuel Bray, Judges 
Shouldn’t Have the Power to Halt Laws Nationwide, ATLANTIC (Oct. 31, 2018), https://
www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/end-nationwide-injunctions/574471/ [https://perma.cc
/VB5D-XL7B] (posing the question, “Can one judge really impose his ruling from one coast to the 
other?” and critizing the practice of nationwide injunctions on various grounds, including 
foreclosing the airing of multiple judges’ views). Public acceptance of a judge’s ruling may also 
depend on a variety of other factors, of course, not least the partisan identification of the judge—
say, as a “Bush judge” or a “Clinton judge.” See generally Bert I. Huang, Judicial Credibility, 61 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1053 (2020) (reporting findings of a survey experiment made possible by 
the fact that district judges appointed by Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton both ruled 
against the Trump Administration in similar ways, in the DACA cases). 
56. As Professor McAdams has argued, legitimacy may enhance a rule’s focal quality and vice 
versa. MCADAMS, supra note 33, at 119–27 (“[T]he focal point power might help to explain how 
law can first obtain legitimacy and . . . legitimacy might help to explain what it is about law that is 
focal.”). 
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the specific-judges approach also seems to demand more precise estimation, 
whereas the original majority principle may invite the use of heuristics,57 thus 
easing the task. Moreover, focusing only on those specific judges with 
parallel cases may reward forum-shopping; it may even spur the filing of 
more cases before selected judges in order to “stack” that subsample.58 By 
contrast, focusing on the whole population of potentially relevant judges 
should tend to have the opposite effect, reducing the motivation for forum-
shopping.59 And more generally, a population-based guess would not be 
pushed about by the appearance of newly filed cases or the disappearance of 
cases dismissed along the way. 
Adopting the original majority principle may require greater judicial 
fortitude, however, if the judges with actual cases were all chosen precisely 
for holding views known to differ from most judges. Supposing such a lineup 
of minority-view judges were in agreement with each other, there would be 
no risk of conflicting injunctions. And yet under the majority principle, all of 
these judges would be asked to explain that they were staying the relief they 
believed to be warranted because they were guessing that yet other judges 
would see things differently.60 Following the majority principle still entails 
the advantages noted above, but it may be a lot to ask of judges who already 
know that they agree with each other.61 What may be gained by a general 
commitment to the original majority principle, however, is (again) some 
reduction in the incentive to forum-shop to these judges in the first place. 
A second alternative is for each judge to base her issue-or-stay decision 
on her best guess of what most judges think the Supreme Court would do. 
This formulation might seem to combine the advantages of a majority-based 
 
57. As suggested above, it seems plausible that a judge would approach the task by assessing 
where she herself stood among fellow district judges, either imagined as a general population or 
represented by those whom she knows. 
58. It may seem a bit ironic that the occurrence of forum-shopping might actually improve a 
judge’s guesses about what those specific colleagues would believe to be the better outcome. 
59. This is not to claim that it will eliminate forum-shopping, of course. Among other reasons, 
as noted, there may be a positive correlation between a judge’s own view and her best guess of the 
majority view. Moreover, recall that even while applying the majority principle in deciding whether 
to issue or stay an injunction, judges will still be expressing their own views of the merits of the 
underlying case in their opinions. And thus, forum-shopping may still be valuable as a way of 
promoting the airing of those judicial views. 
60. In theory, it is also possible that each of these judges was forum-shopped for being likely 
not to issue any relief at all; but this is not how forum-shopping usually works, and in any event, 
one would not worry about the risk of a clash of injunctions in such a scenario. (To be clear, this 
possibility is distinct from a court that is asked to issue an injunction supporting or restoring an 
original state of affairs—for example, the district court in Texas in the DACA cases much discussed 
above.) 
61. A more palatable option for such a scenario may be suggested by the pattern of partial stays 
in the recent “sanctuary cities” cases. See supra note 19 (detailing these partial stays). In those cases, 
even as it became clear over time that virtually all courts with parallel cases would likely rule against 
the Government in similar ways, a pattern nonetheless emerged in which each court (both district 
and circuit courts) articulated the nationwide injunction that it would order—while staying it except 
as to the immediate plaintiff or to a limited geographic area. See supra note 19. 
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approach with a forward-looking awareness that, for some cases, the 
Supreme Court will have the final say and that the lower courts should be 
approximating that result from the outset. This formulation seems less useful 
than the original majority principle, however, for a couple reasons. First, 
district judges often are asked to do things the Supreme Court generally does 
not do; for example, it may seem somewhat odd to ask what kind of 
preliminary injunction the Court would issue.62 Second, in cases where the 
Court does have a discernible view relevant to the issue-or-stay decision, then 
this input is already subsumed in guessing what a majority of district judges 
would do if one sensibly assumes they would follow the Court’s lead.63 
A third alternative is that all judges should, out of an abundance of 
caution or as an extreme version of comity, stay any intended injunctions if 
there is a chance of a clash, until a definitive resolution is supplied by the 
relevant higher court. This is just the unstable outcome of {stay A, stay B} 
already discussed in Part I. It is unstable because each judge would prefer to 
issue her own intended injunction, feeling compelled to grant relief as long 
as it will not clash with another order (say, if the other judge is staying 
anyway). Thus, the intuitive attractiveness of such an all-stay-pending-
appellate-resolution approach would tend to be undermined by its likelihood 
of failure, unless the relevant higher court weighs in fast enough. Moreover, 
especially in cases challenging a new government action, it probably won’t 
help persuade district judges to maintain an all-stay holding pattern to argue 
that such an approach has the special advantage of preserving the “status 
quo”—for the obvious reason that the whole point of a preliminary injunction 
is to preserve an earlier “status quo,” the state of the world before this latest 
government action.64 
 
62. This seems true even if the Court does sometimes adjust lower-court orders on an emergency 
basis, and so there might be a bit of suggestive data to consult. See, e.g., Wolf v. Cook Cty., 140 S. 
Ct. 681, 681 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from grant of stay) (noting apparently increasing 
willingness of the Court to grant the Administration’s requests for emergency stays of injunctions, 
including in this case); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 599 (2020) (staying 
injunction); Barr v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 140 S. Ct. 3, 3 (2019) (staying injunction). For 
historical instances of the Court itself issuing temporary or preliminary injunctions that barred 
application of a federal law against parties beyond the plaintiffs during the 1910s and 1920s, see 
Sohoni, supra note 11, at 943–55. 
63. Moreover, if the Court’s position is clear enough on such a determinative issue, then it seems 
unlikely there would be a danger of conflicting injunctions in the first place. 
64. This scrambling of the baseline is illustrated by Justice Sotomayor’s observation in her 
recent dissent against the Court’s stay pending appeal of a preliminary injunction in the Northern 
District of Illinois that would otherwise have barred a new administrative rule from taking effect 
solely in that state: 
In sum, the Government’s only claimed hardship [in arguing for the stay] is that it must 
enforce an existing interpretation of an immigration rule in one State—just as it has 
done for the past 20 years—while an updated version of the rule takes effect in the 
remaining 49. 
Wolf, 140 S. Ct. at 683 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from grant of stay). It is also illustrated by how 
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It may thus be more promising to think of an all-stay combination as a 
sensible, if cautious, starting point for district judges before they themselves 
collectively shift to one of the stable outcomes, {stay A, injunction B} or 
{injunction A, stay B}—ideally, based on the majority principle.65 And such 
an approach becomes all the more compelling in a sequential version of the 
problem, a story involving path dependence, which we turn to next. 
III. Extensions and Limitations 
What if one judge issues an injunction first? Won’t the others feel a need 
to act consistently with whatever that judge has ordered? And what happens 
to an equilibrium when an appeals court reverses a district court? This Part 
addresses these important extensions. It then acknowledges the limitations of 
this Article’s analysis, including the crucial assumption that judges care 
enough about conflicting injunctions to want to avoid them. 
A. The First-Mover Advantage 
Even when parallel cases are brought before multiple courts around the 
same time, judges do not generally issue orders simultaneously. Thus, some 
judges will already know what at least one of their colleagues has decided to 
do by the time of their own decisions. And because of their aversion to a clash 
of injunctions, there may be a path dependence in which all later judges 
match (or do not conflict with) that first injunction. One might note, for 
example, that in the DACA cases, the resulting set of coordinated orders 
aligns with the specific contours of the injunction issued by the first judge in  
California.66 The judge in New York matched it exactly.67 After the judge in 
D.C. declared that vacatur was appropriate (implying relief going beyond the 
earlier injunctions), he soon clarified that his vacatur was to be stayed in part 
 
both the D.C. and Texas district courts in the DACA cases used the term “status quo” to refer to the 
even later state of the world when the two matching preliminary injunctions were already in place. 
See Texas v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 3d 662, 741 (S.D. Tex. 2018); NAACP v. Trump, 321 F. 
Supp. 3d 143, 146 (D.D.C. 2018) (mem. op.); see also infra notes 69–70 (detailing these courts’ 
references to “status quo”). 
65. One possible variation involving partial stays is (again) suggested by an emergent practice 
in which the federal courts are articulating the nationwide or universal injunctions that they believe 
to be appropriate, while staying them except as to the immediate plaintiffs (for whom the injunctions 
do take effect) or except as to a limited geographic area. See supra note 19. To speak in terms of 
the framework illustrated in Figure 1, such an all-partial-stay approach may be more “tolerable” to 
the issuing courts because at least the immediate plaintiffs do get relief. Yet, it fits this framework 
nonetheless because the court would still prefer for the nationwide or universal injunction to go 
fully into effect (or else it would have crafted a narrower injunction). 
66. The specific contours were that the government would continue to process DACA renewals 
but did not need to restart the process of accepting new applications for DACA status. Regents of 
Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d, 
908 F.3d 476, 486 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019). 
67. See Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 437 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), cert. before 
judgment granted, 139 S. Ct. 2773 (2019). 
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in a way that again matched the earlier injunctions.68 Even more dramatic 
was the decision by the judge in Texas: despite having expressed a view on 
the merits that DACA itself is unlawful, he nonetheless denied the 
Government’s request for an injunction ending DACA, thereby averting a 
clash of contradictory orders.69 
Path dependence is not inevitable, however, for the simple reason that 
the first judge (or any judge) can always modify her initial choice. That is 
why the coordination game described in Part I, in which judges are described 
as deciding contemporaneously, remains a useful analytical device. And yet, 
it is also possible that in some cases, the costs of alteration are perceived to 
be high, say, because that first injunction creates reliance interests or because 
a shift to a different equilibrium would create confusion.70 If so, the first 
injunction may have a sticky quality that pulls later orders into alignment. If 
nobody expects that initial order to be altered, then such an alignment will be 
stable; it may be hard to dislodge, unless the judges all agree to change their 
orders at the same time. 
But allowing such a first-mover advantage to be exercised without a 
higher-level guiding principle seems to invite a twisted mix of forum-
shopping and racing-to-a-remedy by strategic parties. And even without such 
manipulation, the first court to reach the remedial stage might be in that 
position precisely because it has less of an evidentiary record to grapple with  
(say, about the relevant equities and hardships). More generally, information 
about the universe of parallel cases, and about what is at stake, may 
accumulate over time. 
 
68. See NAACP v. Trump, 321 F. Supp. 3d 143, 146 (D.D.C. 2018) (mem. op.) (“The Court 
will stay its order [of vacatur] as to new DACA applications and applications for advanced parole, 
but not as to renewal applications.”), cert. before judgment granted, 139 S. Ct. 2773 (2019). 
69. Texas v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 3d 662, 741–42 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (mem. op.). The 
judge explained: 
This Court does not necessarily agree with some of the reasoning (and the bases given 
for the decisions made) by the other courts that have addressed the rescission of 
DACA. Nonetheless, in each case in which an injunction or order of vacatur was issued 
and in this case in which an injunction is not being issued, the purpose of the orders 
was to maintain the status quo until a definitive decision could be reached. If this Court 
were to grant an injunction, it would upset that balance. 
Id. Based on the context, it would appear that the mentioned “status quo” was that DACA renewals 
(but not new applications) would continue to be processed. 
70. This appears to have been a consideration for the judge in D.C. in issuing a partial stay of 
vacatur two weeks after his initial ruling vacating the rescission. NAACP v. Trump, 321 F. Supp. 
3d 143, 146 (D.D.C. 2018) (mem. op.) (expressing concern about aggravating the confusion 
surrounding the status of the DACA program); see also supra note 28 (detailing this judge’s 
rationale); cf. Priscilla Alvarez, The Immigration Fight That May Soon Land in the Supreme Court, 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/daca-trump-
supreme-court/568174/ [https://perma.cc/B46R-3SH7] (“Immigrant-advocacy groups, such as 
United We Dream, are encouraging recipients to apply for renewal despite the confusion around 
current litigation.”). 
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Thus, I would argue that any judge who thinks she might be the first to 
issue an injunction should adopt the majority principle.71 Moreover, she 
should also be willing to update her guess (if feasible), were it to become 
apparent that most of her colleagues with parallel cases are guessing 
differently about the majority view. 
Procedural benefits follow. If it is widely known that judges would be 
applying this majority principle even if they were the first to decide, then the 
incentives for forum-shopping litigants to race to the courthouse might be 
reduced. In addition, adopting the majority principle is an even stronger 
expression of comity by the judge, in this sequential story: she is essentially 
disavowing her own first-mover advantage relative to her colleagues (even if 
in fact she retains the advantage) because she is choosing not to impose her 
own view. Rather, she is offering her best guess of what would happen “if all 
of us judges were deciding this altogether.”  
One might say that her first-mover advantage is transfigured into a form 
of leadership in norm-creation, as she would also be announcing a comity-
based convention for others to follow.72 Furthermore, this first judge’s 
willingness to update her own guess (as more information becomes available) 
would amount to truly relinquishing her first-mover advantage. In effect, it 
brings the coordination problem back to the simultaneous-move version 
originally described, restoring a symmetry among the judges that befits the 
ideals of collegiality and parity. 
One way for this first judge both to signal such a willingness to adjust 
and to enable it as a practical matter is initially to stay her injunction  
(if any) while also expressing her best guess of the majority view. As other 
judges do the same, they will all start to see what their colleagues’  
guesses are (while any injunctions are stayed). As we know, such an  




71. This is consonant with the foregoing analysis (which assumed contemporaneous decisions) 
because any judge who has not yet observed what the other judges will decide is, in effect, in this 
position of possibly being the first. But to be clear, in the sequential story, asking the first judge to 
adopt the majority principle is potentially asking her to go off-equilibrium, if her more self-
interested choice would be to use her first-mover advantage instead to impose her preferred outcome 
on all later judges. (By contrast, in the simultaneous-move story explored in Part I, the majority 
principle is a way of choosing an equilibrium among multiple options.) 
72. And needless to say, it will be more likely that the resulting stable outcome reflects the true 
majority view—because that is her aim—even if there is path dependence after she issues her 
injunction. See supra subpart II(D). 
73. The instability is useful here because the alternative would be to dislodge a self-reinforcing 
outcome, which would require all the judges involved to switch at the same time. If communication 
among judges is acceptable practice in such situations, then simultaneous switching would be 
relatively easy; even so, whether an all-stay starting point is better than a first-injunction starting 
point is an open question, one that depends on the hardships to interested parties entailed by each 
of the outcomes as well as the costs of changing course. 
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staging point, the majority principle can guide the judges collectively  
toward agreement on who should be maintaining their stays and who should 
be lifting theirs. 
B. Appeals 
Appellate review of equitable relief tends to be limited and deferential—
and it should remain so when the appeals court is reviewing a district judge’s 
decision (to issue or to stay her injunction) based on the majority principle. 
This Article’s general prescription for the appeals courts is to aid, or at least 
not hinder, the district courts in solving their coordination problem. In 
particular, appeals courts should respect the district courts’ use of the 
majority principle. When necessary, they might reinforce its use by 
encouraging or directing district courts to follow the principle.74 But the 
appeals courts should rarely, if ever, upset the stable outcomes that emerge 
from district courts already coordinating among themselves by following the 
principle. This can be done even while the appeals courts are fulfilling their 
own role in law declaration—and thus, even if a circuit split emerges on the 
underlying merits. For illustrations, consider the following. 
Suppose an appeals court rules in a way that leans in favor of a 
preliminary injunction being issued. If it is affirming a district court that has 
already issued or stayed such an injunction based on the majority principle, 
then it should leave that injunction or that stay in place.75 But if it is reversing 
a district court that had originally ruled against any relief, then it should 
remand, in which case the district court would then follow the majority 
principle in either issuing or staying the injunction implied by the appellate 
ruling.76 
If the appeals court rules in a way that leans against relief, there is 
certainly no worry about creating a conflict of injunctions. For example, 
suppose an appeals court decides to reverse the tentative merits ruling that 
supports a district court’s preliminary injunction. On its own, such a reversal 
does not worsen the risk of conflicting injunctions (at most, it would be lifting 
an injunction). And if there are matching concurrent injunctions in place, then 
there should be no change in the real-world outcome because the courts 
 
74. A norms-reinforcing role for the appeals courts to play may become especially useful in 
scenarios when it becomes clear that one or more of the district judges with the parallel cases does 
not care about clashing with others (much less about bothering with the majority principle). For 
further discussion, see infra subpart III(C). 
75. If the district court has issued an injunction that seems consistent with the majority principle, 
but without articulating it, the appeals court could affirm on the basis of the majority principle or 
remand for the district court to consider it expressly. 
76. In the DACA cases, this was the posture of the Fourth Circuit decision. See CASA de Md. 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 924 F.3d 684, 706 (4th Cir. 2019) (reversing the district court in 
Maryland and remanding for further proceedings). 
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remain in equilibrium.77 Indeed, this may be a good reason for multiple courts 
to issue matching concurrent injunctions, as we have seen in the DACA 
cases.78 
But a trickier situation arises if the district court being reversed is the 
only court that has issued the injunction. Now the question arises for any 
other court that has been staying a contrary injunction whether it should lift 
its stay (after all, there is no longer a danger of conflicting injunctions). The 
default answer I propose is “no,” if the stay was put in place based on the 
majority principle, especially if it remains possible that another district court 
with a parallel case (and also based on the majority principle) may yet issue 
an injunction similar to the one erased by the appeals court. But one might 
also ask whether every other judge should now update her best guess about 
the majority view based on the appeals court’s ruling. Again, the default 
answer I propose is “no,” if what was being corrected in the reversal was not 
the district judge’s guess about the majority view but rather her guess about 
  
 
77. For example, in the DACA cases, if the Second Circuit had reversed the judge in New York 
in a way that required it to lift its preliminary injunction, the same injunction issued by the judge in 
California would still have remained in place, thereby maintaining the stability of the existing 
outcome. 
78. See NAACP v. Trump, 321 F. Supp. 3d 143, 148 (D.D.C. 2018). The judge made special 
note of the usefulness of concurrent injunctions and orders: 
And although there are currently two preliminary injunctions in place requiring DHS 
to continue accepting renewal applications, as the Court has previously noted, ‘those 
injunctions are both on expedited appeals and hence could be reversed in the not-too-
distant future.’ . . . This Court’s order—which, unlike the preliminary injunctions 
entered in parallel litigation, is a final judgment—will therefore prevent irreparable 
harm to plaintiffs and all current DACA beneficiaries should those other injunctions 
be reversed. Hence, it will not be stayed as to renewal applications. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). For the application of a similar logic to damages and noting that if 
multiple awards of damages can be run concurrently, appellate reversal of one of the awards would 
not change the amount actually paid, see Bert I. Huang, Concurrent Damages, 100 VA. L. REV. 711, 
744–47 (2014). 
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that (sole) circuit court’s view on an underlying merits question in that case.79 
An especially helpful appeals court might even make clear in its opinion that 
it is not disturbing the former.  
More generally, this distinction between regulating a district court’s use 
of the majority principle in its issue-or-stay decision and regulating the 
underlying merits is what allows the majority principle to continue to be 
useful even when a circuit split emerges on the latter. Just as district courts 
can expressly disagree about the merits (or the ideal remedy) even while 
following the majority principle in their issue-or-stay decisions, so too can 
circuit courts expressly disagree about the merits (or the ideal remedy) while 
allowing the district courts to continue following the majority principle.80 
C. Heterogeneity 
An important limitation of this Article’s scope lies in a crucial 
assumption: that every judge with one of the parallel cases is averse to a clash 
of injunctions, seeing it as the worst outcome—and in particular, worse than 
staying her own intended injunction while a different one is issued. In the 
present story, this assumption is responsible for the inherent instability of a 
conflicting-injunctions outcome; it is the reason judges always seem to 




79. This default might be overridden if an appeals court says that it is in fact correcting the 
district court’s best guess about the majority view. If so, then one district court’s best guess has 
officially been changed, and the relevant district judges may wish to assess whether their calls about 
the majority view were so close that one changed data point is enough to tip them to the other side. 
But I would urge appeals courts not to interfere in this way. It is not an obvious institutional 
competence of theirs to outguess district judges about what district judges would do. And the risk 
of creating confusion for other district judges—and possibly a disruption to a stable outcome—does 
not seem to be worth it. After all, the immediate tasks at hand for the appeals court (law declaration 
and the lifting of this one district court’s injunction) have been accomplished. 
80. Notably, “percolation” about the merits (or about the remedy) can thus continue among both 
the district courts and the circuit courts, even while the majority principle is broadly in use. This is 
not to argue that circuit splits or disagreements among district judges are generally a good thing, 
but only to point to the reality that some circuit courts today do not shy away from creating splits. 
There was a time when circuit courts gave more deference (if not quite precedential force) to the 
rulings of other circuits. See Thomas Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE 
L.J. 969, 1008 (1992) (“In effect, a legal interpretation of another circuit is regarded as prima facie 
correct, and is given more or less deference depending on contextual factors such as the extent of 
consideration given the issue by which other circuits and how long its precedent has been 
followed.”). My impression is that such a norm has somewhat faded. But if not, or if it returned to 
prominence, another promising solution might be for district judges to borrow this norm and 
likewise give deference (when appropriate) to the prior decisions of fellow district judges—at least, 
when facing a possible clash of injunctions. As the prior discussion of the first-mover advantage in 
subpart III(A) suggests, such a norm could coexist with the majority principle (the first judge 
follows the majority principle, and later judges defer to her guess, if appropriate). I thank my 
colleague Tom Merrill for proposing this possible deference-based solution, as well as for our 
illuminating conversations about this project more generally. 
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To illustrate what may happen if one judge is not much bothered by 
conflicting injunctions, compare Figure 2 with Figure 3.1. In the latter, 
Judge C does not suffer a loss of −3 when there is a clash of injunctions, but 
rather considers it a tolerable 0. Now, Judge C would always rather issue his 
injunction, regardless of what he expects Judge A to do.81 Knowing this, and 
therefore expecting Judge C to issue his injunction, Judge A would rather 
stay. A single stable outcome is possible: {stay A, injunction C}. Notice that 
a clash is still averted, but only because Judge A still cares enough to 
avert it.82 
The clash might not be averted, however, if both judges are unbothered 
by it. In Figure 3.2, Judge C as well as Judge D now consider it to be a  
tolerable 0 rather than a loss of −3. Here, the judges would each always prefer 
to issue an injunction. Accordingly, the only stable outcome is the clash 
of injunctions. 
When one or both judges do not care to avert conflicting injunctions, 
their situation is no longer a coordination game. There is no need for this 
Article’s guidance in setting a convention about who yields because either 
one judge is forced to yield (as in Figure 3.1) or neither judge will ever yield 
(as in Figure 3.2). Then the question is whether these scenarios are likely to 
occur. The latter seems implausible given how rarely an actual clash of 
injunctions is ever observed, even in situations where judges with opposing 
views have been forum-shopped by plaintiffs with opposing aims. It is not so 
easy, based on observational evidence, to reject the former story, in which 
Judge C will always get his way. But I would speculate that contemporary 
norms among federal judges strongly disfavor such an unyielding posture.  
At least, for now. A future reader may well be musing to herself, 
“comity—how quaint.” But here’s what we see today: an epic surge of 
nationwide injunctions that has thus far dodged any enduring clashes, with 
district courts and circuit courts alike showing a willingness to innovate to 
ensure such consonance, if not for the sake of comity then to avoid the costly 
confusion of incompatible demands.83 Even if turnover in the judiciary does 
bring in an occasional Judge C, and even if interested parties are able to 
forum-shop to him, his impact might still be tempered by appellate review. 
This is all the more so, if the majority principle comes to be widely adopted, 
helping to reinforce the current norms it serves. 
 
 
81. If he expected Judge A to stay, then he gains the greater value of 2 from issuing his 
injunction than of 0 from also staying; and if he expected Judge A to issue her injunction, then he 
gains the greater value of 0 from also issuing his injunction than of −1 from staying. 
82. The other outcome that had been an equilibrium before {injunction A, stay C}, is no longer 
stable because in this variation, Judge C would then prefer to switch to issuing his injunction. 
83. See supra text accompanying notes 1–30 and notes 1–4, 6, 19. 
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That said, there is heterogeneity among judges—in their degrees of 
aversion to conflicting injunctions, in the strength of their beliefs about 
certain outcomes being better, and in their willingness and ability to guess at 
the majority view, among other dimensions. One worthy aim for future work 
would be to explore alternative approaches that expressly address such 
variation, especially if the seeming trend towards a more polarized judiciary 
continues. For example, one might examine the potential role of first-mover 
injunctions that have the quality of compromises, splitting the difference as 
a way of ensuring that such an outcome remains more tolerable than a clash 
of injunctions in every later judge’s view.84 
Conclusion 
One final thought: How do we know that the federal courts, as they seem 
to coordinate their injunctions without fail, are not already following some 
approximation of the majority principle proposed here? After all, acting 
consonantly with the prevailing view among relevant colleagues may seem 
to many judges a rather obvious way to avoid clashing—one that resonates 
with comity, mutual respect, fairness, collegiality, and familiarity.  
Maybe they are. All the better. The modest service of this Article would 
then be to help the norm-creation along, by spotlighting this approach and 
urging judges to articulate it expressly, in hopes of making it still more salient 
for future courts. 
 
 
84. Although no judge in the DACA cases characterized the concurrent injunctions from the 
judges in California and New York as a compromise, and although each judge offered reasons for 
limiting the relief to the renewal of existing DACA recipients (while not extending it to require the 
processing of new applications), one might notice that this specific injunction happened to sit in the 
middle of the range of views of the correct outcome among the five district judges involved—
ranging from the judges in Maryland and Texas, who believed the Government had the better of the 
merits, to the judge in D.C., who would have entirely vacated the rescission and thereby restored 
the full operation of DACA. See supra notes 1, 4–6. 
